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Anne 0.  Krueger 
One of the central tenets of economists for the past two centuries has been the 
proposition  that  free trade  between  nations  will  in most  circumstances  be 
highly beneficial, and that any nation which unilaterally adopts a policy of free 
trade will benefit.’ There are exceptions to the argument for free trade, such as 
in cases of infant industries and more recently “the new trade theory.”2 
Nonetheless, it has been a source of considerable frustration to most interna- 
tional economists that, in reality, protection to industries, and pressure for it, 
is granted in circumstances that appear to bear little resemblance to those cases 
in which economic analysis suggests it might be warranted on the grounds of 
national economic interest. 
Many have therefore turned their attention to attempting to understand the 
“political economy” of protection, by which is meant the actual determinants 
of  which  industries  receive  protection,  and  of  the  structure  of  protection 
across industries. 
Most such efforts have focused on the empirical estimation of models in 
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1. The recognized exception to this generalization that is relevant for the United States is when 
a country has monopoly power in trade. Even that exception, however, is contingent upon the 
trading partners being unable to retaliate in ways that are sufficiently harmful. There are also 
arguments that “market failures,” such an externalities, might make the adoption of a free-trade 
policy less desirable. Economists’ standard answer to that, however, has been to note that the 
appropriate policy response to these failures is to correct them at their source, i.e., to impose a tax 
or subsidy to reflect the value of the externality. 
2. The “new” trade theory demonstrates that there may be circumstances under which an inter- 
vention in trade (which might be an export subsidy, an export tax, an import duty, or even an import 
subsidy) could increase the total economic well-being of a country in circumstances where the 
first entrant(s) to an industry become established and receive the economic rents that accrue to 
first-comers. The rationale is that first entrants can achieve a scale of production sufficient enough 
to simultaneously charge a low enough price to deter other entrants and still have that price sig- 
nificantly above the marginal cost of production. 
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which the presence of tariffs (or other trade barriers) andor their height is to 
be explained. Variables such as the level of  employment in the industry, the 
trend in the industry’s employment And  profitability, and the geographic con- 
centration of the industry are then used as possible explanatory factors. In gen- 
eral, almost every variable appeared to have explanatory power in some cases, 
but there was no strong systematic pattern that emerged from these analyses. 
The National Bureau of Economic Research project on the political  econ- 
omy of U.S. trade policy  was designed to try to supplement and enrich the 
understanding of the political economy of trade policy by undertaking parallel 
analyses of the determinants of protection and its evolution  in a number of 
American industries (seven, in the event), and by examining the determinants 
of  administered protection across industries.’ The hope was that in-depth in- 
vestigations of  how protection actually has evolved in industries whose cir- 
cumstances were evidently dissimilar would shed light on the process of pro- 
tection  and its determinants, and perhaps yield richer hypotheses for further 
analysis. 
The industries chosen for inclusion are textiles and apparel (the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement [MFA] ), steel, automobiles, semiconductors, lumber, wheat, and 
agricultural protection  as negotiated  under  the  North American  Free  Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). These analyses were supplemented by a “cross-section’’ 
study of determinants of “administered protection.” 
Textiles and apparel represent an industry whose fortunes have been declin- 
ing since the early part of  the twentieth century, and where pressures for pro- 
tection have been intense since the mid- 1950s. Many parts of the industry are 
relatively labor-intensive, and it is geographically widespread. Protection has 
been granted to the industry under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, an increas- 
ingly complex set of quantitative restrictions on imports negotiated by individ- 
ual product category under an umbrella arrangement concluded under the aus- 
pices  of  the  General Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT).“ Steel  and 
automobiles, by  contrast,  are  industries in  which U.S.  firms held  dominant 
positions worldwide until at least the early 1970s. Since that time, both indus- 
tries have lost their preeminent positions, imports have increased, and both 
have sought protection. Both are highly visible industries but neither is labor- 
intensive, and both are reasonably geographically concentrated. Protection for 
automobiles came in the form of voluntary export restraints (VERs) on imports 
from Japan during the early and mid-1980s-although  there had been pres- 
sures earlier, only then were VERs adopted and later abandoned. Protection 
for steel under VERs and other administrative arrangements was accorded for 
much of the  1970s and 1980s after the industry filed a large number of com- 
plaints alleging unfair trade practices on the part of foreign producers. These 
3. “‘Administered  protection” is the term applied to the use of the countervailing duty (against 
foreign subsidies) and antidumping (against pricing below cost or below sales price in other mar- 
kets) administrative law by firms seeking relief from import competition. 
4.  Under the Uruguay Round agreement, the MFA is to be phased out over a twelve-year period. 3  Introduction 
pending cases were then used as a bargaining instrument in negotiating export 
restraints  with foreign  governments. By the end of  the  1980s, however, the 
steel industry’s ability to achieve protection through this means was greatly di- 
minished. 
The semiconductor industry, by contrast, is much smaller and is also a “new” 
industry. It is certainly not labor-intensive, and it is reasonably geographically 
concentrated. Its initial development in the 1960s and 1970s was led by Ameri- 
can  firms, but by  the late  1970s the preeminence  of  these firms was being 
challenged by a successful Japanese entry into the market. Starting in the early 
1980s it sought protection,  which it finally achieved, at least in part, in the 
Semiconductor Agreement  of  1986 and  subsequent agreements negotiated 
with Japan. 
Interestingly, these four industries were protected through bilateral arrange- 
ments made by the United States and foreign governments. As can be seen in 
the individual studies in this volume, the U.S. administration (and the foreign 
government)  was frequently reluctant  to enter into such protective arrange- 
ments but did so in the belief that failure to undertake these measures would 
spur  “administered  protection”  or congressional  action  that  might  be  even 
more protective of the industry. 
The U.S. lumber industry represents yet another situation. The industry is 
relatively small and geographically concentrated. It certainly does not have the 
visibility of  textiles and apparel, steel, automobiles, or even semiconductors. 
Nonetheless, since the early 1980s, the U.S. lumber industry has also sought 
protection against Canadian imports through the administered protection pro- 
cess. In the eyes of many U.S. trading partners and economists, administered 
protection  under  U.S.  trade  laws has become the “protectionist  weapon  of 
choice.” As such, inclusion of an industry whose primary approach to the pro- 
tection process was through the use of fair trade laws seemed highly desirable 
in the project. 
The final two studies focus on agriculture, where the mechanisms and instru- 
ments used for protection are quite different from those of American industry. 
One focuses on wheat. Wheat has long been a major grain crop in the Midwest, 
one in which the United States is generally believed to have considerable com- 
parative advantage. An export enhancement program for wheat, under which 
American wheat farmers in effect received protection in their exports during 
the 1980s, provided considerable protection to American wheat exports. 
The other agricultural study examines the rule and fortunes of various ag- 
ricultural  groups in the negotiations  leading up to NAFTA.  Some producer 
groups were considerably  more effective than others in delaying the time or 
reducing the rate at which trade with Mexico would be freed from restraints. 
An analysis of who was influential, and why, sheds further light on the determi- 
nants of protection. 
The final study focuses  on administered protection  seen from a different 
perspective.  Critics of U.S. trade law  (antidumping and countervailing  duty 4  Anne 0.  Krueger 
legislation) have suggested that the very processes that are established confer 
protection to U.S. industries, regardless of whether the outcome of the process 
finds for the complainant and grants protection. Robert Staiger and Frank Wo- 
lak study this phenomenon, with findings that are important in their own right, 
and simultaneously provide insight from yet another angle into the overall po- 
litical economy of protection. 
Each study can stand alone. But together they shed additional light on the 
political economy of U.S. trade policies. The first seven chapters examine the 
studies individually. A final chapter then summarizes some of  the important 
questions that arise, from a policy perspective, from the findings in the individ- 
ual studies. Much more complete analyses of the individual cases and the find- 
ings can be found in the NBER volume based on the project that is forthcoming 
from the  University  of  Chicago Press,  The Political Economy  of American 
Trade Policy. 